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Resumo
O mito da democracia racial é ainda muito presente na sociedade bra-
sileira, embora a literatura econômica aponte para a existência de um alto
grau de discriminação racial. Este artigo visa inferir sua existência nos sa-
lários eficientes do mercado de trabalho feminino, levando-se em conta o
problema do viés de seleção. As causas da ineficiência são também inves-
tigadas. Os resultados mostram que o diferencial de salário eficiente, não
explicadas por diferenças no capital humano, é significativo, sendo maior
entre as trabalhadoras mais eficientes. Por conseguinte, políticas tradi-
cionais possuem apenas um efeito limitado para reduzir as diferenciais
salariais entre raças.
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Abstract
The myth of racial democracy is still widespread in the Brazilian so-
ciety, although economic literature has continuously documented perva-
sive racial discrimination. This study analyzes racial discrimination in
the Brazilian female labor market using a Mincer stochastic wage frontier,
corrected for sample selection. The results, using Oaxaca-Blinder decom-
position, showed that an efficient wage differential, not explained by dif-
ferences in human capital does exist and is large among the most efficient
workers. Wage inefficiencies are also explained and it is a claim of the
study that traditional policies might be a tool in reducing underpayment
dispersion, but cannot cope with pure discrimination.
Keywords: Racial discrimination; Female Labor Market; Affirmative Ac-
tion
JEL classification: J71
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1413-8050/ea85456
* Professor Assistente do Departamento de Gestão Pública da EAESP-FGV. São Paulo, São Paulo,
Brasil
Recebido em 23 de agosto de 2012 . Aceito em 12 de dezembro de 2014.
242 Fernandes Economia Aplicada, v.19, n.2
1 Introdução
Racial conflicts are almost absent in Brazil and that might be the reason why
Brazilians, in general tend to believe that discrimination is not a relevant pro-
blem. Freyre (1933), one of the most important Brazilian anthropologists,
wrote a book containing the results of his lifelong research, in which he epi-
tomized racial democracy in Brazil. That belief is still subscribed to by the
Brazilian elite, which believes that racial democracy continues to prevail in
the country 1.
This view has been seriously questioned in the economic literature. Henri-
ques (2001), using the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD)
— the national household sample survey carried out annually since 1976 by
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, IBGE, the Brazilian Bureau of
the Census, presents strong evidence against Freyre’s perception of an ideal
racial democracy, as far as economic outcomes are concerned. His study has
shown that in Brazil, Afro-Brazilian men earn only 40 to 50 percent of what
white men earn. The average monthly income in all regions of Brazil was
the highest for white men and the lowest for non-white women, with white
women earning more than non-white men in all regions of the country.2
The Brazilian Census has a peculiar way of classifying people, when it
comes to race. Actually, people are not classified by race; they are, instead,
classified by color. The miscegenation of races resulted in a special color for
some people who were classified as pardo by IBGE, meaning an individual of
mixed race. Pardos are treated as persons of African descent. If we add the
black and pardo people, Brazil has the largest African descent population in
the world, outside Africa. For 2005, PNAD data indicated that 47.37 percent
of the Brazilian population was white while black and pardo accounted for
around 52.37 percent of the 187 million inhabitants of Brazil. This means the
size of the black population, including persons classified as pardo3, is second
only to that of Nigeria.
However, if one looks at the distribution of income in Brazil, it is easy to
see that the black constitute only about 26.7 percent of the population in the
highest income decile, while they represent 59.76 percent of the population
in the poorest one. Figure 1 shows the income distribution as per 2005 PNAD
data. It clearly shows that the black population in Brazil has a strong presence
among the poor and a very weak presence among the high-income brackets.
Barros et al. (2000) and Ferreira (2000) argue that differences in educa-
tional attainment are a major factor contributing to unequal distribution of
income in Brazil. The presence of a large proportion of blacks among the
poorest might be because education levels are very different between racial
groups. The discrepancy in years of schooling between blacks and whites is
2.13 years, according to 2005 PNAD data. It might look relatively small but
it is rather large when compared to the seven years of average schooling for
1Broadly speaking, racial democracy is the conception of an ideal society, of equals, in which
the color of the skin presents no barriers for social mobility. The opposite conception is discri-
mination based on social classes. For a detailed description about the Brazilian racial debate, see
Telles (2004).
2Average monthly income in 2005 was Real the Brazilian currency) 1077.27 for white men,
679.83 for white women, 549.29 for nonwhite men and 356.89 for non-white women (25 years or
older).
3This approach will be followed in the rest of the article.
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Figura 1: Population distribution by decile and by color
the entire population above 25 years of age. The picture becomes clearer when
one looks at the evolution of education among groups. Defining a cohort as so-
meone born between 1929 and 1974, average years of schooling for the whole
population increased steadily, but the difference in years remained constant
between blacks and whites throughout this period.
The differences between skin color groups become even more pronoun-
ced when a gender distinction is made. Kassouf (1998) shows that even after
controlling for human capital, measured by educational attainment, a woman
could make only 75 percent of a man’s salary in Brazil in 1995. More recently,
Carvalho et al. (2006) found that 97% of the difference between white men
and black women wages is due to discrimination. Both papers, showing gen-
der wage differentials favoring men, support the view presented in this study
- i.e. if both race and gender differences are taken into account, then black
women are likely to be at the bottom of the Brazilian socio-economic ladder.
In fact, the average wages of black women in 2005, according to PNAD, were
64 percent of those of a black man and only 33 percent of the average salary
of a white man.
Racial discrimination, from the perspective of economics, is measured by
wage differentials unexplained by differences in contribution to economic out-
comes, which are usually explained according to a scheme presented by Min-
cer (1970, 1974) that became known in the literature as the Mincer Equation.
Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), working with Mincer’s formulation, deve-
loped a methodology to decompose the wage gap among groups of persons
into a first component attributed to individual characteristics (or human ca-
pital) that affect productivity and another component associated with discri-
mination. This framework has also been used to analyze variants of decompo-
sition techniques by simulating counterfactual distributions, combining data
on individual characteristics from one distribution with estimated parameters
from another.
Zuchi & Hoffman (2004) and Zuchi (2006) show that wage differentials
between white and blacks4,unexplained by human capital assets as measured
4They also include pardos as part of the Black population.
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by years of education and experience between whites and blacks, could be as
high as 30.9 percent for 2003. Arcand & d’Hombres (2004) worked with data
of the 1998 survey covering men in the 25-65 age group. Applying basically
the Mincer Oaxaca framework but using a quantile Mincer-Oaxaca regression
analysis, they encountered wage differential favoring male workers that goes
from 38.95 percent for the first decile up to 48.1 percent for the last decile
of the wage distribution. Their results show rising wage differentials as one
goes up in the wage distribution scale and the wage gap. According to Arcand
and d’Hombres, discrimination is more prevalent as the color of the skin gets
darker. Matos & Machado (2006), also using PNAD data, applied the Oaxaca
decomposition to Mincer equations and found that from 1987 to 2001, race
and gender had a significant contribution to explain wage inequalities in Bra-
zil.
The brief literature review has documented pervasive racial discrimina-
tion in Brazil and there is little doubt that dark skin is a handicap to social
advancement. Our aim is to go even further, analyzing the Brazilian female
labor market, so that discrimination will be the result of the Oaxaca decompo-
sition in an estimated efficient Mincer wage function corrected for selection
bias. Simultaneously, the factors that might contribute to pulling black female
workers away from their respective Mincer efficient frontiers will be presen-
ted.
After this introduction, estimation procedures are in the second part de-
tailed. Data is described in the following section. PNAD 2005, a nationwide
household survey is used. In the fourth part, before the conclusion, results
are presented. Racial discrimination seems to be very important in Brazil
even when one looks to efficient wages, which are larger the more efficient
the worker is. This analysis adds to the evaluation of policy instruments that
could be used to improve efficiency as well as reduce wage disparities within
wage groups, leading to improvement in the wage distribution. Moreover, if a
wage gap attributed to racial discrimination is encountered, it can be argued
that the effect of traditional remedies, very often proposed to eliminate or di-
minish discrimination, reach a bound given by the estimated value of pure
form of discrimination. In this sense, even the most efficient black worked
would still be discriminated.
2 Conceptual Framework
The methodology used to infer discrimination in the labor market relies hea-
vily on the stochastic frontier model which has been traditionally used in the
framework of studies concerning productive efficiency ever since Aigner et al.
(1977) and Meeusen & Van Den Broeck (1977) defined and used the concept
in a simultaneous and yet independent way. One pioneering application of
this technique in labor economics was that of Robinson & Wunnava (1989).
Other prior studies include Hofler & Murphy (1992, 1994). The former esti-
mated the extent to which effective wages of workers are below the potential
maximum they could earn, given their marginal productivity, while the latter
estimated the worker’s reservation wage. Both papers adopted the framework
of search theory. McClure et al. (1998) also take up the question of wage inef-
ficiency but compare Stochastic Frontier estimations for the United States and
Canada. Dawson et al. (2001) analyze the question of relative underpayments
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to male and female workers. Prieto et al. (2003) use the Stochastic Frontier
wage model to estimate returns to education for potential and effective wa-
ges. They estimated the impact of formal schooling on workers potential ma-
ximum wages. Lang (2005), analyzing discrimination against migrant labor
in Germany, claims that human-capital endowments determine earning po-
tentials rather than actual earnings, and uses stochastic earnings frontier to
estimate differences between natives and migrants for the year 2000.
This article adds to this body of literature by using the Oaxaca decompo-
sition in a Mincer frontier wage function corrected for sample selection bias.
It is our correction for sample selection that makes it possible to obtain con-
sistent estimates of the Stochastic Frontier function, thus allowing an Oaxaca
decomposition based on a consistent estimation procedure. Furthermore, by
separating efficient from inefficient wages, the analysis allows a better unders-
tanding of the unexplained wage differential between groups of laborers.
2.1 The Stochastic Frontier
The starting point of our estimation procedure will be the definition of a Sto-
chastic Frontier Mincer (log) earnings function, obtained from a set of vari-
ables, all of them reflecting their income generating inputs according to the
following specification:
ln(wi
∗) = x,iβ +vi (1)
Where w∗i is the potential wage earned by the worker, xi is a column vector
of worker characteristics, and occupational and regional differences in labor
markets, β is a vector of parameters associated with each variable to logarithm
of potential or efficient wage earned by the worker and vi a vector of parame-
ters associated with each variable to logarithm of potential or efficient wage
earned by the worker and:
ln(wi) = ln(wi
∗)−ui (2)
where ui is a random, non-negative variable.
The potential wage of each worker is the frontier wage or the efficient wage.
Effective or observed wage is given by the Stochastic Frontier minus the non-
negative random variable that captures the difference between potential and
effective wage:
ln(wi) = x
,
iβ +vi −ui (3)
The earning function is perceived as a frontier. It represents the potential
or maximum wage that a worker would receive given her capital endowment
as well as occupational and regional characteristics of the labor market. The
non-negative random term ui represents the extent to which observed ear-
nings fall short of potential earnings.
The difference between efficient and observed wage a worker earns is ex-
plained by a set of variables reflecting individual and labor market characte-
ristics, Si = (Si1,. . . ,Sim) and a new rannor term such that:
ui = Si
′δ + ηi (4)
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where δ′ = (δ1, ...,δm)
′ is a vector of parameters to be estimated, ui ≥ 0 and
ηi(0,σ
2
u ) are truncated at the point −Si
′δ, in such a way that ηi ≥ −Si
′δ. Under
these assumptions, ui is a normally distributed variable with its mean depen-
ding on the specific explanatory variables reflecting individual and labor mar-
ket characteristics and truncated at zero, such that N+(Si
′δ,σ2u ). Following Aig-
ner et al. (1977), vi is an idiosyncratic effect specific to an individual worker
that could enter the model with either sign, such that we can supposevi (0,σ
2
v ),
independent of and of the regressors.
The end result is the Mincer Stochastic Frontier model represented by
equation 3 above. The frontier or potential wage is given by equation 1. The
inefficiency term is given by ui, a random variable of particular interest on
this setting. Since the data is in log terms, ui is a measure of the percentage by
which the particular individual fails to achieve the particular potential ideal
wage rate. The final Mincer Stochastic Frontier model (Equation 3) has a com-
posed error term εi = vi −ui
5
2.2 Sample Selection
Once a distribution for ui is assumed, the next step is the definition of the
likelihood function for i and to obtain a set of parameters β and δ that ma-
ximizes the likelihood. However, there is an additional problem that has to
be dealt with in order to obtain consistent estimates of parametersβ: sample
selection.
In this study, a two-step Heckman procedure will be used to take into ac-
count the selection process that might be present in our estimation of the Min-
cer Stochastic Frontier equation. In the first step of the Heckman procedure,
the selection process, responsible for selection bias problems is studied with
the so-called selection model. The bias is caused by existence of differences
between employed and non-employed (hence earn no wages) women, which
are related to their income. So it is necessary to compare these groups (em-
ployed and non-employed women) to find out what the differences are. For
this purpose, generally, a probit model is estimated6 .
Following the economic literature, in our study, the dependent variable in
the probit analysis is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the female is
employed. Independent variables in the model are the relevant characteristics
of the respondents, available in the data set, such as education, age, formal
or informal jobs, number of children 10 years old or younger, and the total
number of children in the household. In the probit analysis, we estimate the
effects of these variables on the employment decision. Besides that, the effect
of unmeasured characteristics which are related to the employment decision
5To complete the specification of themodel and to allow estimation is required a specification
of the distribution of the error term. Kumbhakar & Lovell (2003) suggest three possible distri-
butions for the inefficiency term: exponential, half normal and truncated normal. We are going
to use the truncated normal, differently from Lang (2005) who used the exponential distribution
and afterwards explained the estimated inefficiency as function of explanatory variable in a two-
step estimation procedure. We follow Prieto et al. (2003) argument favoring a joint estimation of
the frontier parameter vector and of the parameter vector associated to the variables explaining
inefficiency for. However, as shown by Greene (2002), the estimated inefficiency differs very little
when different distributions are assumed for . The distribution will matter for the specification
of the likelihood function to be used in the estimation procedure.
6We assume that the error term of this model is normally distributed, one of the assumptions
underlying the Heckman model
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process can be estimated through the residuals of the probit analysis. After
all, the variation which remains in the dependent variable after removing the
effect of the known factors can only be caused by the influence of unknown
factors. That is the reason why in the Heckman (n.d.) procedure, the residuals
of the selection equation are used to construct a selection bias control factor,
which is equivalent to the Inverse Mills Ratio7.
In the second step of the Heckman procedure, Stochastic Frontier analysis
of the effects of human capital on the logarithm of wage is carried out, which
we call the Mincer Stochastic Frontier equation. In this analysis, we use the In-
verse Mills Ratio as an additional independent variable. Because we now have
a control factor in the analysis for the effect of the logarithm of wage related
unmeasured characteristics, which are also related to the employment deci-
sion, the human capital predictors in the Mincer Stochastic Frontier equation
are free from this effect: the Mincer Stochastic Frontier analysis, therefore,
produces unbiased coefficients.
2.3 Limitations
Before going to the description of the practical estimation of the Heckman
model, a word of caution should be brought forward. Although theoretically
the procedure sounds appropriate, applying it in practice is not so simple.
An important condition for its use is that the selection equation contains at
least one variable which is not related to the dependent variable in the subs-
tantial equation, otherwise severe problems of multicolinearity may arise and
the addition of the correction factor to the substantial equation may lead to
difficulties in estimation and to unreliable coefficients.
Formalization of the Mincer Stochastic Frontier model, corrected for sam-
ple selection, follows Greene (2003). Assuming that the sample selection fol-
lows a general framework, the equation that determines the sample selection
process is8:
ln(wli) = z
′
i + ξi (5)
while the equation of primary interest is equation (2). The sample selection
rule is that wage is observed only if wli > 0, which in our analysis means that
the observed wage is greater than the reservation wage, and the individual is
participating in the labor force. Let us assume that viand ξi have a bivariate
normal distribution with zero mean and correlationρ, and that
E(uiξi) = E(viui ) = 0 (6)
Under those assumptions, the estimated Inverse Mills Ratio is introduced
in the Mincer Stochastic Frontier as an additional regressor to correct for sam-
ple selection. The equation in the second step is estimated by maximum like-
lihood, with the Inverse Mills Ratio as additional regressor.
ln(wi |z
∗
i > 0) = x
,
iβ +λ
φ(z′γ/σξ )
Φ(z′γ/σξ )
+ vi −ui (7)
7For a definition of the Inverse Mills Ratio, see Greene (2002).
8Zi is a column vector of worker characteristics, and occupational and regional differences in
labor markets. It shares the same variables as Xi and has at least one additional variable which
must be not related to the dependent variable in the substantial equation.
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This new model will henceforth be called the Mincer-Heckman stochas-
tic earning frontier model. It can be estimated for each of the two groups of
female workers: black and white. Furthermore, for each group of laborers,
the parameter vectorδ, associated with the mean vector of the truncated nor-
mal distribution, is jointly estimated. This estimation is carried in such a way
that we can have an estimate of the percentage return on human capital for
individuals on the efficient frontier, corrected for sample selection, as well as
estimation of the contributing factor to inefficiency in each of the two female
labor markets. Once the Mincer-Heckman stochastic frontier is estimated, the
next step is to observe if wage differential between black and white still per-
sists.
2.4 Discrimination
Economic discrimination is a broad and inaccurate concept, despite the exis-
tence of large differences between population groups which are elaborately
empirically documented, showing great stability in due course. A widely ac-
cepted definition comes from the fact that identical objects have the same
price. Thus, considering the workforce as a commodity, two individuals with
identical productivity and in this sense equal, should have the same wage.
Discrimination occurs when workers with the same productive abilities
but belonging to different population groups, earn different wages, invalida-
ting the hypothesis of neutrality of trade. Therefore, economic theories that
try to explain the phenomenon of discrimination aim at finding the precise
conditions in the labor market in which identical goods are priced distinctly.
The job offer for two individuals is considered essentially identical if they
display the same degree of productivity in the material process of production
of goods. The idea of productivity in this context should be seen in a broad
manner, including a variety of factors, such as work attendance, cooperation
skills, and expertise — in addition to the actual expected future productivity,
among other things.
Evidently, equality of economic agents makes sense only in relation to va-
riables that are exogenous to the process of discrimination. Be a vector of
productive characteristics that determine the productivity and observable by
the business as well as being exogenous, a dummy that adopts the value 1 if
the individual belongs to the segment of the measured population.
α = (Y |X,Z = 1)− (Y |X,Z = 0) (8)
In a fully egalitarian society α is equal to zero, where Y is the expected
value of Y , conditioned by X, i.e.,all-or-equal, with the exception of the social
group.
2.5 Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is used to estimate the wage earning differen-
tial that can not be attributed to differences in human capital endowment. As
it was just shown, unexplained differences in wages between the two groups
are usually attributed to racial discrimination. If separate wage regression
equations are fitted for black and white female workers, the underlying re-
gression models are:
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ln(ww,i ) = xw,i
′βw + εw,i , i − 1, ...,nw (9)
ln(wb,i ) = xb,i
′βb + εb,i , i − 1, ...,nb (10)
where nw and nb represent black and white female samples, respectively.
Regressor vectors include socio-demographic variables, such as occupa-
tion, region, and human capital variables. A comparison of these two regres-
sions allows us to perform what has been known in the literature as Oaxaca
(1973) decomposition, which is based on a comparison of regression functions.
For any two vectors of characteristics,
ln(ww,i )− ln(wb,i ) = x
′
w,i(βw,i − βb,i ) + (xw,i − xb,i )
′βb (11)
The second term in this decomposition is identified with differences in hu-
man capital that would explain wage differences due to differences in human
capital endowment between white and black female laborers, assuming that
labor markets respond to these differences naturally. The first term shows the
differential in log wages that is attributable to differences unexplainable by
human capital; holding these factors constant at xw makes the first term attri-
butable to other factors, such as discrimination. Therefore, it is not easy to see
that the first term can be used to estimateα:
ln(ww,i )− ln(wb,i ) = x
′
w,iα + (xw,i − xb,i )
′βb (12)
In this study, the Oaxaca decomposition is performed using estimates ge-
nerated by the Mincer-Heckman frontier functions for white and black female
workers as estimators for βw and . The difference between this procedure and
Oaxaca’s is that here, Mincer-Heckman Stochastic Frontiers are used to per-
form an Oaxaca style decomposition for estimating potential wage for both
groups of women, while the conventional procedure uses OLS estimation or
Heckman two stage estimation. If the hypothesis that is rejected, then the
data shows evidence of wage differentials not attributable to differences in
human capital between the two groups of laborers which can be considered
an estimate of pure racial discrimination, based on estimated potential wage
for black and white female workers, corrected for selection bias.
Dispersion of efficiency within each female group still remains to be ex-
plained. Inefficiency dispersion is analyzed with the estimated underpay-
ment for black and white female workers, derived from the estimation of the
Mincer-Heckman Stochastic Frontiers. Estimation of the frontiers follows the
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003) procedure, assuming that the random ineffici-
ency termu, in Equation 6 follows a truncated normal distribution9.
3 The Data
Our empirical analysis uses 2005 PNAD data. After data cleaning, when ob-
servations with any missing information were eliminated, the sample was re-
duced to 140,078 individuals, 25 years or older . Out of this sample, 61,183
9The normal-truncated normal model used in the estimation of the Mincer Stochastic Fron-
tier and the resulting likelihood function is derived by in Kumbhakar & Lovell (2003). Once the
log likelihood is maximized with respect to the unknown parameters, all the information neces-
sary to estimate underpayment for each individual in the sample is at hand. The approximated
formula to estimate the underpayment was developed by Jondrow et al. (1982).
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were female workers who constituted the sample used in the study, with 30,489
classified as white and 30,551 black, based on the reported color of their skin.
Table 1 and 2 present a summary description of variables for all female wor-
kers used for model estimation. Their average monthly wage was 519.95, ave-
rage years of schooling was 9.0, meaning that the mean female worker was
almost finishing high school (in Brazil it takes 10 years to finish high school).
12.2 percent of female workers had at least 15 years of schooling, which is
required to complete some college study.
Tabela 1: Variables Description
Wage(1) Wage in Reales
Educ Years of Formal Education
Educ17(2) Individual has at least under graduation degree
Exper Years of experience in the labor market
SE Individual lives in the Southeast Region
N Individual lives in the North Region
NE Individual lives in the Northeast Region
S Individual lives in the South Region
CW Individual lives in the Center West Region
Urban Individual lives in an urban place
Maid formal Individual works formally as a servant in someone’s home
Maid informal Individual works informally as a servant in someone’s home
Formal Labor Individual has a formal job
Age In years
Unionized Individual is a members of a union
Children Number of Children
Indust. Sector Individual works in the industrial sector
Child<10(3) Individual has a less-than-10-year child
Dependent - Partner Individual is the partner of the head of the family
Dependent - Son Individual is the son of the head of the family
Dependent - Others Individual is neither the partner nor the son of the head of the family
The average number of children was 1.8; 17.3 percent were working in do-
mestic servant type of jobs that can be broadly described as “domestic assis-
tance”; 4.3 percent had formal employment; and 16.7 percent were unionized.
The northeast and southeast regions have high concentration of female wor-
kers and accounted for close to 60 percent of the female labor force. Northeast
is the least developed region of Brazil and the southeast the most developed,
as measured by per capita income. Thirty-nine point seven percent of black
women had at least one child 10 years old or younger, while the figure for
white female workers was 35 percent.
Table 2 also presents the same results, for white and black female workers,
respectively. Average wage for white female workers was 759.14 reals while
for black female workers it was 396.49 reals. A white female worker, on ave-
rage, earns 1.9 times more money per month than an average black female. If
one looks at education and experience, years of education of whites is 26 per-
cent higher than for blacks. Higher education, defined as more than 15 years
of schooling, is observed in 20.7 percent of whites in the sample while only
7.5 percent of blacks had higher education. Thus, white females have some
edge in terms of human capital. If this is a possible explanation for the huge
wage gap between white and black female workers, much still remains to be
seen and we hope to shed some new light on this important social issue.
One important limitation for female labor is motherhood; raising small
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Tabela 2: Data Summary
Female Labor MarketWhite Female Labor MarketBlack Female Labor Market
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Wage(1) 514.946 958.755 759.143 1334.816 396.499 637.159
Educ 8.986 4.447 9.783 4.618 7.715 4.540
Educ17(2) 0.122 0.327 0.207 0.405 0.075 0.263
Exper 21.433 14.631 25.784 13.123 26.248 13.221
SE 0.290 0.454 0.347 0.476 0.245 0.430
N 0.123 0.329 0.066 0.249 0.172 0.378
NE 0.304 0.460 0.188 0.390 0.410 0.492
S 0.173 0.378 0.295 0.456 0.057 0.233
CW 0.110 0.312 0.103 0.304 0.116 0.320
Urban 0.819 0.385 0.124 0.329 0.183 0.387
Maid formal 0.042 0.200 0.038 0.192 0.056 0.231
Maid informal 0.131 0.337 0.091 0.288 0.153 0.360
Formal Labor 0.252 0.434 0.285 0.451 0.193 0.395
Age 36.276 13.333 41.157 11.336 40.584 11.262
Unionized 0.168 0.374 0.209 0.407 0.177 0.382
Children 1.778 1.288 1.622 1.124 1.924 1.410
Indust. Sector 0.125 0.331 0.139 0.345 0.111 0.314
Child<10(3) 0.339 0.473 0.350 0.477 0.397 0.489
Dependent - Partner 0.480 0.500 0.576 0.494 0.541 0.498
Dependent - Son 0.226 0.418 0.046 0.209 0.053 0.224
Dependent - Others 0.068 0.252 0.118 0.322 0.117 0.322
(N=61,183) (N=30,489) (N=30,694)
(1)Wages are measured in Brazilian Currency Reals; the average black market rate for the dollar
was 2.7 Reals per dollar
(2)Indicates individuals with 15 or more years of schooling
(1)Women having at least one child 10 years old or younger
children demands intense mother care, making it difficult for women to parti-
cipate in the labor market. As it has been shown by several studies (e.g., Heck-
man (n.d.), Kassouf & Silvia (2000) and Killingsworth & Heckman (1986)),
the presence of small children imposes an upward drift in female reservation
wage. If one omits this aspect of selection of sample of female labor supply,
one can obtain only biased estimates of the effect of wages on the female labor
supply. As it is possible to see in Table 2, 39.7 percent of black female wor-
kers have children 10 year old or younger; in case of white female workers,
only 35 percent have small children. Another important fact evident from the
table is that a high percentage of black women are working as maids. Maid
is a typically unskilled labor job and it is a service used widely by Brazilian
households. Maids represent 20.9 percent of black female jobs but only 12.9
percent of white female jobs.
This table reinforces what has already been said in the introduction. Black
females are in the lower strata of the Brazilian labor market. Their wages, on
average, are lower; their education is lower, and they are over represented in
low skill, low wage jobs.
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4 Results
4.1 Mincer Equation with Heckman Sample Selection Correction
10
The first part of the analysis deals with sample selection. The results of the
estimation of the Mincer equation, corrected for sample selection, are presen-
ted in Table 3. It is possible to immediately see that the estimation of Mincer
equation without correction for sample selection leads to inconsistent OLS es-
timates. Likelihood-ratio statistics strongly reject independence of the error
term of the selection model from the error term of the wage equation for black,
as well as for white female workers. The identifying restriction is the presence
of young children in the household, preventing women from being employed
if the woman is married. Under these circumstances there might be a larger
probability for reservation wage to be above the market wage. This result fol-
lows previous findings in Brazil, analyzed by Kassouf (1998), and for other
economies, as presented by Killingsworth & Heckman (1986), among others.
Presence of young children has a negative and significant impact on parti-
cipation of black and white female workers in the labor market. Marriage also
contributes to lower labor force participation for black as well as for white fe-
male laborers.
4.2 Mincer Stochastic Frontier
Estimation of the Mincer equation in a Stochastic Frontier framework has
been used as an instrument to analyze underpayment, defined as:
ln(wageobsik )− ln(wˆage
l
ik) = uˆik, ik = 1, ...,nk ;k = black,white (13)
where ln(wageobsik ) is observed wage and ln(wˆage
l
ik) isestimated frontier wage,
i. e. the maximum wage a female worker can earn given her human capital
endowment; uˆik is a measurement of underpayment, i. e., how much more
she would be able to make if she were getting efficient or frontier wage.
Table 4 shows the estimation of Mincer Stochastic Frontier without the
correction for sample selection bias for black and white female laborers. Both
estimated Mincer frontier present a somewhat larger return to education than
the Mincer equation corrected for sample selection bias reported in Table 511.
One year of education, in the Mincer equation of Table 5, leads to a return
of 5.9 percent for blacks while without correction for sample selection, the
return would be 6.3 percent; for white workers, with the Mincer equation
corrected for sample selection bias, one year of education had a return of 9
percent while in the Mincer Stochastic Frontier, the return was 9.2 percent.
10In a first analysis, Wald testes were carried with the null hypotheses that coefficients are the
same for black and white women. For this, pooled regressions were estimated; a dummy for black
and interaction dummies with all explanatory variables were created. In all cases, racial equality
was rejected.
11The significance levels presented in this Table are corrected standard errors due to the use
of estimated regressors as explanatory variable in this case the estimated Inverse Mills Ratio for
white and black female workers.. To obtain a standard error asymptotically sound two proce-
dures were carried out: The first was to bootstrap the standard error of all coefficients, and the
second was to derive analytically the formula for the standard error, afterward deriving their
sample values. The bootstrapped values were derived using 500 replications. For the analytical
derivation of the standard errors see Murphy & Topel (2002), Greene (2002).
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One additional year of superior education would result in return of 58.9 per-
cent for blacks and 47.2 for whites. For black workers, one year of college
education would yield a return that is ten times higher than one additional
year of education below college level. For whites, the ratio between return
of one year of college education and one year of education before college is
around five.
The estimated coefficient for the Inverse Mills Ratio is highly significant
for both groups of female laborers. This suggests that sample selection is an
important factor that makes up for omission of a latent structure of a Heck-
man type selection.
Table 6 reports the regression results for underpayment. Underpayment
means that workers with equal capital endowment earn wages smaller than
frontier or potential wages, due to being separated by race. Inefficiency or un-
derpayment decline with more education for both black and white workers.
Formal labor relations improve efficiency, though the impact is stronger for
black workers. Unionization is an instrument for white workers to reduce
inefficiency and yet it is not an instrument for reduction of inefficiency for
black workers. Children of any age are a drawback in terms of efficiency. It is
very likely that children are a factor that makes women accept a smaller than
potential wage. Maids, when informal, contribute positively to the underpay-
ment of women, either white or black.
4.3 Oaxaca Decomposition Results
The main objective of this paper is to present a measure of pure racial dis-
crimination, defined by the first term of the right hand side of equation 10,
as discussed above. To achieve this, we used the estimated coefficients of the
second stage Mincer-Heckman equations for white and black female workers.
The value of pure discrimination is obtained using average sample values of
the explanatory variables for the white workers group multiplied by the dif-
ference between the estimated frontiers’ coefficients for white and for black
female laborers. In other words, after taking into account differences in hu-
man capital endowment and frontier’s estimated coefficients, an unexplained
difference ranging from 19.6 to 14.8 percent still remains, when one goes from
the highest efficient or potential wage percentile to the lowest.
In order to understand these differences, as we move along the frontier,
we compare only efficient wages while separating the sample by percentiles.
Table 7 presents the results. As we can observe in the table, Oaxaca diffe-
rence unexplained by human capital tends to enlarge as efficient wages incre-
ase along the frontier. For the highest 1 percent wages, pure discrimination
amounts to a 19.6 percent wage differential, while for the 90 percent percen-
tile, the Oaxaca difference falls to 14.8 percent wage differential. Therefore,
results show that even the most efficient black worker is discriminated in the
Brazilian female labor market. Worse than that, the more efficient she is, the
more discriminated she will be.
One could ask why this study separates black and white workers in la-
bor markets. The answer is very simple: if estimated wage differences were
small enough, and only individual human capital endowments were able to
explain wage differentials, then one could treat all females, black and white,
as a distinct labor market. However, if after taking care of differences in hu-
man capital endowments, unexplained difference is still large, then to treat
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Tabela 3: Estimated Mincer Equations with Sample Selection
Black Female Worker White Female Worker
Log Wage Labor Force Log Wage Labor Force
Educ 0.087
(0.002)∗∗
0.097
(0.003)∗∗
0.103
(0.002)∗∗
0.078
(0.003)∗∗
Educ17 0.546
(0.025)∗∗
0.475
(0.019)∗∗
Age 0.053
(0.003)∗∗
0.070
(0.007)∗∗
0.056
(0.004)∗∗
0.071
(0.007)∗∗
Age sq −0.001
(<0.001)∗∗
−0.001
(<0.001)∗∗
−0.001
(<0.001)∗∗
−0.001
(<0.001)∗∗
N −0.032
(0.017)
−0.313
(0.037)∗∗
−0.044
(0.023)
−0.265
(0.051)∗∗
NE −0.371
(0.014)∗∗
−0.195
(0.031)∗∗
−0.313
(0.016)∗∗
−0.256
(0.036)∗∗
S 0.054
(0.024)∗
−0.159
(0.053)∗∗
0.049
(0.014)∗∗
−0.311
(0.032)∗∗
CW 0.107
(0.018)∗∗
0.032
−0.045
0.087
(0.019)∗∗
−0.096
(0.047)∗
Married −0.324
(0.056)∗∗
−0.23
(0.065)∗∗
Number Children at Home −0.037
(0.011)∗∗
−0.043
(0.014)∗∗
Child < 10 −0.028
(0.031)
−0.063
(0.034)
Urban 1.248
(0.024)∗∗
1.299
(0.028)∗∗
Ind. Sector 0.772
(0.047)∗∗
0.922
(0.049)∗∗
Dependent — Partner −0.704
(0.053)∗∗
−0.729
(0.062)∗∗
Dependent — Son −0.426
(0.067)∗∗
−0.414
(0.082)∗∗
Dependent — Others −0.165
(0.078)∗
−0.394
(0.083)∗∗
Constant 3.889
(0.078)∗∗
−0.722
(0.169)∗∗
3.798
(0.081)∗∗
−0.591
(0.184)∗∗
Observations 25545 25545 24432 24432
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):
chi2(1) = 123.85 chi2(1) = 53.94
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%
black and white females as different components of the markets is a correct
stand and it is a sign that racial discrimination exists and has to be dealt with
in empirical analysis.
In fact, results show that a form of pure discrimination still persists in the
Brazilian female labor market. On average, there still remains an unexplai-
ned wage gap of 13.3 percent. We also encounter rising pure discrimination,
when one moves along the efficient wage frontier. Consistent with these fin-
dings, the estimated Mincer-Heckman Stochastic frontiers have shown that
education is a factor that improves potential wage for blacks as well as for
whites; however, the impact of education is greater for whites than for blacks,
such that education improves potential wages at a faster rate for whites than
for blacks, which leads to increasing differences in potential wages as human
capital increases.
Furthermore, when one looks at inefficiency in women labor markets, one
can observe that several factors contribute to underpayment to both white
and black female laborers in Brazil; children make women, black or white,
accept less than potential wages; however, the impact of underpayment is
more severe in case of black women. Unionization contributes positively to
reduce underpayment of white women but it does not affect underpayment of
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Tabela 4: Mincer-Heckman Stochastic Frontier Estimation
Without Sample Selection Correction
Black Female Worker Log WageWhite Female Worker Log Wage
SE Bootstrapping SE Bootstrapping
Educ 0.063
(0.002)∗∗
0.063
(0.002)∗∗
0.092
(0.002)∗∗
0.092
(0.002)∗∗
Educ17 0.579
(0.020)∗∗
0.579
(0.025)∗∗
0.467
(0.017)∗∗
0.467
(0.018)∗∗
Age 0.034
(0.004)∗∗
0.034
(0.004)∗∗
0.040
(0.004)∗∗
0.040
(0.005)∗∗
Age sq −0.001
(<0.001)∗∗
−0.001
(<0.001)∗∗
−0.001
(<0.001)∗∗
−0.001
(<0.001)∗∗
N 0.018
(0.014)
0.018
(0.014)
−0.029
(0.021)
−0.029
(0.020)
NE −0.237
(0.011)∗∗
−0.237
(0.011)∗∗
−0.267
(0.015)∗∗
−0.267
(0.016)∗∗
S 0.006
(0.019)
0.006
(0.019)
0.015
(0.012)
0.015
(0.013)
CW 0.116
(0.015)∗∗
0.116
(0.015)∗∗
0.111
(0.017)∗∗
0.111
(0.017)∗∗
Union 0.245
(0.015)∗∗
0.245
(0.016)∗∗
0.183
(0.015)∗∗
0.183
(0.016)∗∗
Urban 0.066
(0.020)∗∗
0.066
(0.019)∗∗
0.076
(0.026)∗∗
0.076
(0.023)∗∗
Constant 4.670
(0.085)∗∗
4.670
(0.084)∗∗
4.362
(0.095)∗∗
4.362
(0.102)∗∗
Observations 20700 20643
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%
Tabela 5: Mincer-Heckman Stochastic Frontier Estimation Results
Black Female Worker White Female Worker
Log Wage Log Wage
SE Corrected SE Bootstrapping SE Corrected SE Bootstrapping
Educ 0.059
(0.002)∗∗
0.059
(<0.001)∗∗
0.059
(0.002)∗∗
0.090
(0.002)∗∗
0.090
(<0.001)∗∗
0.090
(0.002)∗∗
Educ17 0.589
(0.020)∗∗
0.589
(<0.001)∗∗
0.589
(0.023)∗∗
0.472
(0.017)∗∗
0.472
(<0.001)∗∗
0.472
(0.019)∗∗
Age 0.031
(0.004)∗∗
0.031
(<0.001)∗∗
0.031
(0.004)∗∗
0.037
(0.004)∗∗
0.037
(<0.001)∗∗
0.037
(0.005)∗∗
Age sq < 0.001
(<0.001)∗∗
< 0.001
(<0.001)∗∗
< 0.001
(<0.001)∗∗
< 0.001
(<0.001)∗∗
< 0.001
(<0.001)∗∗
< 0.001
(<0.001)∗∗
N 0.028
(0.014)∗
0.028
(<0.001)∗∗
0.028
(0.015)
−0.024
(0.021)
−0.024
(<0.001)∗∗
−0.024
(0.020)
NE −0.231
(0.012)∗∗
−0.231
(<0.001)∗∗
−0.231
(0.012)∗∗
−0.262
(0.015)∗∗
−0.262
(<0.001)∗∗
−0.262
(0.015)∗∗
S 0.011
(0.019)
0.011
(<0.001)∗∗
0.011
(0.017)
0.022
(0.013)
0.022
(<0.001)∗∗
0.022
(0.012)
CW 0.115
(0.015)∗∗
0.115
(<0.001)∗∗
0.115
(0.015)∗∗
0.112
(0.017)∗∗
0.112
(<0.001)∗∗
0.112
(0.017)∗∗
Union 0.244
(0.015)∗∗
0.244
(<0.001)∗∗
0.244
(0.016)∗∗
0.182
(0.015)∗∗
0.182
(<0.001)∗∗
0.182
(0.016)∗∗
Urban −0.025
(0.028)
−0.025
(<0.001)∗∗
−0.025
(0.028)
0.010
(0.036)
0.010
(<0.001)∗∗
0.010
(0.033)
Blackmillsratio −0.171
(0.036)∗∗
−0.171
(<0.001)∗∗
−0.171
(0.034)∗∗
-I −
−
−
−
Whitemillsratio - - - −0.120
(0.044)∗∗
−0.120
(<0.001)∗∗
−0.120
(0.042)∗∗
Constant 4.862
(0.093)∗∗
4.862
(0.001)∗∗
4.862
(0.090)∗∗
4.500
(0.108)∗∗
4.500
(0.001)∗∗
4.500
(0.117)∗∗
Observations 20700 20643
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%
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Tabela 6: Regressions Results for Inefficiency Wage
Black Female Worker White Female Worker
Inefficiency Inefficiency
Educ −0.202
(0.025)∗∗
− 0.001
(0.023)
Child<10 0.434
(0.135)∗∗
0.382
(0.203)
Urban −1.004
(0.165)∗∗
− 2.001
(0.382)∗∗
Maid Formal −22.476
(4.511)∗∗
−12.193
(3.579)∗∗
Maid Informal 0.299
(0.127)∗
2.336
(0.441)∗∗
Formal Labor −17.183
(2.726)∗∗
−11.429
(2.700)∗∗
Age −0.057
(0.030)
0.018
(0.042)
Age sq 0.001
(0.001)∗∗
0.001
(0.001)
Union 0.802
(0.167)∗∗
− 0.725
(0.301)∗
Children 0.057
(0.046)
0.132
(0.080)
Ind. Sector 2.429
(0.257)∗∗
3.117
(0.578)∗∗
Constant −0.972
(0.840)
− 5.771
(1.802)∗∗
Observations 20700 20643
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant
at 1%
Tabela 7: Oaxaca Decomposition by Increa-
sing Efficient Wage
Efficient Wage Quantile Pure Discrimination (%)
0.01 0.196
0.05 0.158
0.10 0.143
0.20 0.137
0.30 0.143
0.40 0.153
0.50 0.155
0.60 0.153
0.70 0.151
0.80 0.150
0.90 0.148
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black women. Education contributes to a reduction in underpayment (in other
words, it improves efficiency), but again its impact is stronger for a white wor-
ker than for a black worker. Legal employment ties contribute strongly to im-
prove efficiency and to reduce underpayment for both types of laborer, black
and white. The occupation of maid without legal ties, contributes strongly to
the underpayment of women; however, its impact is stronger in case of black
women.
Finally, the paper attempts to contribute to the methodology, to the extent
in which it takes into account the selection bias due to the fact that many
women do not participate in the labor market if the reservation wage is above
the market wage. We used a two-stage Heckman correction in estimation of
the Mincer Stochastic Frontier. Oaxaca type analysis was conducted using the
Mincer Stochastic Frontier estimated parameters such that we could derive a
measure of discrimination, excluding inefficient wages from the analysis.
The end result of our analysis is that reduction of underpayment can be
achieved by traditional policies and enforcement of labor laws. However, it
might happen that part of the inefficiency could be due to the fact that only
part of the workers might be hired under the present labor laws and those ex-
cluded from the legal labor markets have to survive by accepting underpaid
jobs, such as maids, without formal ties. But our results indicate that even
if traditional social economic policies are able to reduce underpayment, the
improvement would be of a higher magnitude for white female workers than
for black female workers. More importantly, even if wage underpayment is
eliminated, there still remains a wage differential that we have called pure
discrimination, which can not be eliminated by traditional policies; it is very
likely that some form of affirmative action policies, with mandatory enforce-
ment, will be required to eliminate this type of pure discrimination in female
labor markets in Brazil.
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